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QUESTION-BEGGING ARGUMENTS AS ONES 
THAT DO NOT EXTEND KNOWLEDGE 
Rainer Ebert* 
Abstract  
In this article, I propose a formal criterion that distinguishes 
between deductively valid arguments that do and do not beg 
the question. I define the concept of a Never-failing 
Minimally Competent Knower (NMCK) and suggest that an 
argument begs the question just in case it cannot possibly 
assist an NMCK in extending his or her knowledge. 
An argument is a set of claims, {P1, P2, …, Pn, C}, all but one 
of which, P1, P2, …, and Pn, are intended to provide rational 
support for the remaining one, C. P1, P2, …, and Pn are the 
premises of the argument, C is the conclusion.
1
 The premises 
and the conclusion may be the meanings of declarative 
sentences in English, Bangla, or any other natural language,
2
 
mathematical statements, or any other propositions that are 
asserted to be true. For the purpose of this article, we will 
restrict ourselves to deductive arguments whose elements, P1, 
P2, …, Pn, and C, can be successfully translated into sentences 
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of Propositional Logic (PL) – also known as Sentential Logic.
3
 
A generic such argument can be represented as follows: 
(I) (P1)  
(P2)  
(Pn)  
(C)  (  and  are sentences of PL.) 
A good argument need not be rhetorically effective, and 
bad arguments at times are, which is unfortunate. For an 
argument to be a good argument qua argument, however, it is 
necessary that it is valid, and has premises that are all true. An 
argument is valid, if, and only if, its conclusion is entailed by 
its premises, . In other words, (I) is valid, if, 
and only if, every interpretation that makes  …, and  
all true also makes  true.
4
 If an argument is valid, and if 
furthermore its premises are all true, it is sound. 
Soundness is necessary for an argument to be good, but is 
it sufficient? Though it is sometimes claimed that all sound 
arguments are good argument, that does not seem to be true. 
Here are two arguments that are certainly sound, but almost as 
certainly bad, each with its PL translation: 
(II) (P)  Plato is dead. (P) p (p: Plato is dead.) 
 (C) Plato is dead.  (C)  p 
(III) (P1) 3 > 1 (P1)  q (q: 3 > 1) 
 (P2)   is irrational. (P2)  r (r:  is irrational.) 
 (C)  3 > 1 (C) q 
The premises of these arguments are true and entail their 
respective conclusions, which is why (II) and (III) are indeed 
sound. Arguments of this kind, however, are often criticized as 
begging the question. Loosely speaking, an argument begs the 
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question if the “conclusion is taken for granted in the 
premises.”
5
 A more precise definition of the fallacy of begging 
the question has been offered by Robert Hoffman, who 
distinguishes between three kinds of arguments:
6
 
“(A) Here, begging the question consists in inferring the 
truth of the putative conclusion not from that of some other 
proposition, but from its own truth, posited as a premise. 
Accordingly, the same proposition is asserted twice, so the 
condition of there being at least two propositions [in an 
argument] is unsatisfied and there is no argument at all. 
When the putative argument does comprise two or more 
propositions, then either (B) the conclusion follows from 
some proposition other than itself, in which case the 
argument is valid and does not beg the question (though it 
may contain unnecessary premises), or (C) the conclusion 
follows only from itself posited as a premise, in which case 
the other premises are unnecessary and the putative 
argument, as in (A), is not an argument at all.”
7
 
(II) and (III) are of the kinds described in (A) and (C), 
respectively, and not arguments at all, according to Hoffman – 
because they beg the question, which is “the error of taking 
oneself to be presenting an argument when one is merely 
asserting the truth of some proposition.”
8
 Only arguments of 
the kind described in (B) are not question-begging, says 
Hoffman, and hence “real” arguments. An example for such an 
argument can easily be constructed by rewriting (III) as 
follows: 
(IV) (P) 3 > 1 and  is irrational. (P) q & r 
 (C) 3 > 1 (C) q 
Here, the conclusion follows from a proposition other than 
itself, and hence the argument is of the B-kind and supposedly 
does not beg the question. This is implausible because (III) and 
(IV) are obviously equivalent. Asserting the truth of “3 > 1” 
and asserting the truth of “  is irrational” is asserting the truth 
of “3 > 1 and  is irrational.” Similarly, in PL, claiming that q 
and claiming that r just is claiming that q & r.
9
 
The Sense in which Every Valid Argument is Circular 
In every deductively valid argument, of course, the conclusion 
is implicit in the premises, just not always as obviously as in 
(IV). How could the conclusion be entailed by the premises 
otherwise? Maybe the lesson from Hoffman‟s proposal is that 
hiding the conclusion in a premise-conjunct
10
 is not hiding it 
enough, which would suggest this alternative proposal: 
(#) An argument begs the question, if, and only if, its 
conclusion is equivalent to a premise-conjunct.
11
 
While (#) is attractive at first glance, it loses much of its 
initial appeal once we understand that (#) implies that every 
valid argument is logically equivalent to a question-begging 
argument. To see this implication, we will use the Disjunctive 
Normal Form Theorem of PL, which states that every sentence 
of PL is equivalent to a PL sentence which is in disjunctive 
normal form (DNF).
12
 A PL sentence is in DNF, if, and only if, 
it “is either a simple conjunction or a disjunction […] of simple 
conjunctions”
13
 – where a simple conjunction is a sentence 
letter by itself, a negated sentence letter by itself, or a 
conjunction of sentence letters and negated sentence letters.
14
 
Applying the DNF Theorem to (I), and with {q1, …, qk} being 
the set of all sentence letters contained in , and , 
we find that 
  and
 , 
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where , , and , , are conjuncts of 
subsets of {q1, …, qk, ~q1, …, ~qk}. If  is not logically true, 
, if, and only if,  is a 
conjunctive component of ). Otherwise,  
holds trivially. 
Next, let us define DNF+ as the form a premise-conjunct or 
the conclusion of a PL argument is in, if, and only if, 
 it is in DNF, 
 each of its disjuncts contains each sentence letter or    
its negation but not both (which means that each 
disjunct contains as many conjuncts as there are 
sentence letters, k), 
 and none of its disjuncts is equivalent to another. 
If a premise-conjunct or a conclusion of a PL argument is in 
DNF and not logically false, then it is logically equivalent to a 
PL sentence which is in DNF+. In particular, , if 
not logically false, can be brought into DNF+ by going through 
the following steps for all , starting with , and 
removing duplicate disjuncts in the end. 
1. If  contains each sentence letter or its negation but 
not both, continue with . 
2. If  contains a sentence letter and its negation, remove 
 and continue with . 
3. For all , if  contains neither qa nor ~qa, add 
 to  using a conjunction. 
4. Repeatedly apply the distribution rule to bring the 
sentence resulting from the previous step into DNF and 
then continue with . 
Analogously, we can bring  into DNF+, if 
the conclusion of the argument is not logically false. The 
disjuncts in the DNF+ equivalents of  and 
 correspond to interpretations that make these 
equivalents true. Therefore, , if, and only if, 
  and
 , 
where , , are the DNF+ disjuncts and . Note 
that, for every interpretation, one and only one  is true. 
Trivially, 
 
Therefore, . The 






For every valid argument, the conclusion is equivalent to a 
premise-conjunct of the argument in this form. Therefore, 
assuming (#), every valid argument is logically equivalent to a 
question-begging argument. 
This or similar lines of reasoning have led some authors to 
conclude that begging the question cannot be understood in 
terms of the logical structure of arguments, and accordingly is 
a rhetorical, pragmatic, or informal fallacy, whereas others, 
including Sextus Empiricus and John Stuart Mill,
16
 concluded 
that all deductively valid arguments beg the question. I will 
propose a formal criterion that charts a middle way between 
these two positions and allow us to make a meaningful 
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distinction between good and bad deductively valid arguments. 
More specifically, it will separate arguments of the kind 
exemplified by (II) to (IV) from arguments that are more useful 
(for the lack of a better word). My criterion is objective or 
“formal” insofar it does not refer to specific individuals; it 
does, however, presuppose a certain kind of person, the Never-
failing Minimally Competent Knower. I think this small 
concession in terms of formal purity is tolerable, especially 
given the fact that the vast majority of people are reasonably 
close to being of this kind. 
Before going into detail, here is the general idea: By 
constructing an argument, “[w]e are trying to get at the truth, to 
know something.”
17
 We are trying to learn something new, 
achieve knowledge that we did not have prior to engaging with 
the argument. In other words, the purpose of an argument is to 
provide us with a justification for believing its conclusion that 
we possibly have not had yet. Hence, if knowledge of the 
premises presupposes the conclusion in the sense that one is 
not justified in believing the premises unless one is justified in 
believing the conclusion, the argument fails to fulfill its 
purpose. Accordingly, an argument could be said to “beg the 
question” if knowledge of the premises entails being justified 
in believing the conclusion. Before I can spell out this account 
of question-begging in more detail, I first need to introduce 
some basic elements of epistemic logic as well as the concept 
of a Never-failing Minimally Competent Knower. 
Basic Elements of Epistemic Logic 
The traditional analysis of knowledge as justified true belief 
has prevailed in Western philosophy for most of its history,
18
 
until the publication in 1963 of Edmund L. Gettier‟s seminal 
three-page article, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”
19
 In 
it, Gettier offers two counterexamples to the traditional 
analysis that are generally regarded as compelling. For the 
purpose of this article, however, I will pretend that it is still 
possible to be a traditionalist with regard to knowledge and 
hope that what I say will motivate a similar analysis of what a 
good argument is on the basis of more sophisticated accounts 
of knowledge, such as the many forms of reliabilism that have 
been developed since the publication of Gettier‟s article. 
If p is a proposition and S an individual capable of 
knowledge, like you and I, let “KS(p)” stand for “S knows that 
p,” “BS(p)” for “S believes that p,” and “JS(p)” for “S has a 
good reason to believe that p.”
20
 Using this notation, the 
traditional analysis of knowledge can be represented as 
. Therefore, 
 (1) , (factuality of knowledge) 
 (2)  , and 
 (3) . 
Note that, in general, equivalence transformations under an 
epistemic operator change the truth value of the overall 
statement. For example, . If S 
believes that p entails q, initially does not believe that q, and 
comes to believe that p at time t, it will take S some time to 
form a belief that q, if S infers q from p at all. Accordingly, at 
time t, . 
Most people spent their whole life without ever hearing 
about the Swabian village of Adelmannsfelden, and never 
come to believe that Franziska von Hohenheim was born there 
(p). For most S, neither , nor . Hence, 
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 is not a logical truth.
21
 Given that there are 
infinitely many propositions and we have limited capacities 
and lifetimes, we in fact never form beliefs about most 
propositions. There is also an upper limit on the number of 
beliefs we can hold about a given proposition. We seem to be 
constituted such that we cannot simultaneously believe that p, 
and that non-p. That is, for all S and all p,  
at any given point in time, which is a consequence of the 
following two widely accepted principles of epistemic logic:
22
 
 (4)  
 (5)  
It is further uncontroversial that knowledge distributes 
over conjunctions, and that a belief is always known by the one 
who holds it: 
 (6)  
 (7)  
Having introduced some basic elements of epistemic logic, 
we can now move on to define a Never-failing Minimally 
Competent Knower. 
The Never-failing Minimally Competent Knower 
If it is possible that a proposition is true, and if that proposition 
entails another proposition, then it must also be possible that 
that other proposition is true. “It is possible that” is what Fred 
I. Dretske calls a fully penetrating operator. In general, an 
operator of PL, O, is fully penetrating, if, and only if, it has the 
following property: if p entails q, then O(p) entails O(q).
23
 Not 
all operators are fully penetrating. Take the operator “It is 
strange that,” for example. “Peter is married to his dog” entails 
that Peter is married, and yet, while it is strange that Peter is 
married to his dog, it is not strange that he is married. The set 
of strange propositions is not closed under entailment. The 
same is true for knowledge. If S knows that p, and p entails q, 
it is not necessarily true that S knows that q. S may simply not 
know that p entails q and hence fail to form a belief that q. 
Since belief is a necessary condition for knowledge, we see 
how one may fail to know something that is entailed by 
something else one does know. One may think this changes if it 
is further assumed that S knows that p entails q and believes 
that q. Even then, however, S may fail to know that q. S may 
not bother to deduce q from p, despite the fact that S knows 
that p, and that p entails q. S may believe that q on some other 
ground instead, and that ground may not justify S‟s belief that 
q, disqualifying it from being knowledge. For example, 
suppose Sadia struggled in class for most of the semester, but 
then turned things around and excelled in the final exam. She 
got a 90 on the final exam, and she knows that, as the results 
have just been released. She also knows that, if she got a 90 on 
the final exam, she will pass the class with a B. But she does 
not bother to infer that she will pass the class with a B from the 
fact that she got a 90 on the final exam. Instead, she believes 
that she will pass the class with a B on the basis of a coin toss. 
The reason why Sadia does not know that she will pass the 
class with a B is that she is not justified in her belief that she 
will pass the class with a B, as tossing a coin as a belief-
forming process is epistemically defective. Accordingly,  too 
is not a fully penetrating operator, and analogous 
counterexamples show that no epistemic operator is.
24
 
Even though the actual reason on the basis of which Sadia 
believes that she will pass the class with a B is a bad reason, a 
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good reason is readily available to her, assuming she has a 
minimal understanding of logic – and the same is true more 
generally. If S believes and is justified in believing that p, and 
that p entails q, the premises of a valid argument, and if S 
further competently infers q from his or her justified beliefs 
that p, and that p entails q, then S has a good reason to believe 
that q.
25
 Why would we be interested in valid arguments 
otherwise? 
In general, I suggest that, for any set of propositions, 
, if its elements jointly entail , S believes and 
has a good reason to believe that  …, and , and S 
competently infers  from  …, and , then S has a 
good reason to believe that : 
 (8)   
        (S competently infers  from )  
Since , it follows that 
(9)   
      (S competently infers  from ), 
. 
This accords with the common idea that we can increase 
our knowledge through inference from propositions we already 
know – deduction transmits knowledge. 
Sadia‟s failure to know that she will pass the class with a 
B is the result of her failure to perform an inference in her 
mind of which she knows that it holds. Let us define a Never-
failing Minimally Competent Knower (NMCK) as a person 
who never fails in this way. If a NMCK knows that  and 
believes with good reason that the antecedent is true, he or she 
– merely in virtue of understanding what it means for one 
statement to entails another – has a good reason to believe the 
consequent to be true.
26
 NMCKs are masters of the most 
fundamental principles of reasoning and understand the most 
basic logical structure of what they know. Whenever they 
know a sentence to be true, they realize the most obvious 
consequences of its PL main connective for what they could 
possibly be justified in believing in. More specifically, S is a 
NMCK, if, and only if, the following conditions hold: 
 (10)  
 (11)  
 (12)  




 (15)  
 (16)  
(10) states that, for all S that are NMCKs, the set of justified 
propositions is closed under known entailment.
27
 (6) and (13) 
jointly imply . It is plausible to 
assume that the reverse, , holds as 
well (NMCKs always “put one and one together”). Since 
bivalence seems to be hardwired into our brains, one may want 
to include  in the list as well. 
The Epistemic Value of Arguments 
Earlier, I argued that an argument fails to fulfill its 
epistemological purpose if knowledge of the premises 
presupposes the conclusion in the sense that one is not justified 
in believing the premises unless one is justified in believing the 
conclusion. For an NMCK, this suggests the following 
definitions of epistemically bad and good arguments: 
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A deductively valid argument is an epistemically bad 
argument (“begs the question”) if it is sufficient for an 
NMCK to know the premises and believe that the conclusion 
is true in order to know the conclusion. In such a case, 
 and nothing is gained with 
regard to extending one‟s knowledge from going through 
and understanding the argument. 
In contrast, a deductively valid argument is epistemically 
good if . An epistemically 
good argument is a guide for NMCKs, which may be more 
or less difficult to follow, on how to utilize their existing 
knowledge to justify beliefs they are not already justified in 
holding. 
Given these definitions, (II) and (III) trivially are epistemically 
bad arguments, and so is (IV), due to (13). Furthermore, every 
instance of the modus ponens begs the question. In contrast, the 
following are examples of epistemically good arguments, each of 
them with the reason why they fail to be question-begging: 
(V) (P) p 
(C) p 
→  Ks(p) |   Js(p) |  Js (p) 
(VI) (P1) p 
(P2)  p  q 
(C) p 
→ Ks (q), Ks (p  q)|  Js (q), Js (p)  Js (q) 
 |   Js (p) |  Js (p) 
(VII) (P1) q 
(P2) p  (q  r) 
(P3)   p 
(C)  r  
→  Ks(q), Ks(p  (q  r)), Ks(p) 
|  Js (q), Js (p)  Js (q  r), Js (p) 
|  Js (q), Js (q  r) |  Js (r) 
The difference between (V), (VI), and (VII) on the one 
hand and (II), (III), and (IV) on the other hand is that the 
former guide us through a valid inference that is not hardwired 
into our brains, while the latter merely state the cognitively 
nearly inescapable. 
I believe this account has a fair level of intuitive plausibility 
when applied to (II) to (VII), but it is not free of problems. For 
example, consider the following argument, which consists of a 
number of modi ponentes strung together: 






Using (3) and (10), we find that knowledge of the premises 
of this argument entails , , …, and 
, and hence . Therefore, it is sufficient 
for an NMCK to know the premises of (VIII) and believe that 
 in order to know the conclusion. I have argued that in such a 
case nothing is gained with regard to extending one‟s 
knowledge from going through and understanding the 
argument. This seems reasonable for  insofar, in this 
case, (VIII) merely states the meaning of the entailment symbol 
and, accordingly, is of little use to an NMCK who, by 
definition, unfailingly performs simple inferences. For , 
however, (VIII) seemingly can well be a useful guide through a 
valid inference. Image you have known P2, P3, …, and Pn for a 
long time and then come to know P1. If you have a minimal 
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understanding of P2, this new piece of knowledge will provide 
you with a good reason to believe that . A belief that , 
however, does not seem to be justified unless and until you 
actually form a belief that . In order to accommodate this 
thought, we could deny that the set of justified propositions is 
closed under known entailment and replace (10) by 
 (17) . 
The modified account resulting from this move renders 
(VIII) fallacious for , while arguments of this form with 
 are recognized as potentially helpful guides for NMCKs. 
This shows that an epistemological approach to the fallacy of 
begging the question can handle a string of modi ponentes. 
Before it can emerge as a serious theory, however, my proposal 
has to be subjected to further scrutiny, as there may well be 
other argument forms that reveal additional problems. 
Conclusion 
The conclusion of every deductively valid argument is 
somehow contained in its premises. I showed exactly how. 
That has led some philosophers to believe that begging the 
question is not a formal fallacy, as otherwise every valid 
argument would be fallacious. I argued that this conclusion has 
been drawn too quickly and proposed a formal criterion that 
distinguishes between good and bad valid arguments. The 
criterion is motivated by the fundamental function of 
arguments – the extension of knowledge. I introduced some 
basic elements of epistemic logic and sketched an 
epistemological account of begging the question. For 
simplicity‟s sake, I built that account on the traditional analysis 
of knowledge as justified true belief. I showed that it handles 
exemplary cases of question-begging arguments well and is 
flexible when confronted with objections. Further work, 
however, is needed, and I hope that I said enough to make my 




1. Sometimes the notion of an argument is defined such that an 
argument can have more than one conclusion. It is always 
possible to divide up an argument with more than one conclusion 
into several arguments that each have just one conclusion, by 
separately combining each conclusion with all premises. 
2. A declarative sentence is a complete and grammatically well-
formed sentence that makes a claim. 
3. Such a translation requires that the premises and the conclusion 
can, in a sufficiently detailed manner, be divided up into their 
respective sub-statements, which are replaced by sentence 
letters, and the logical connectives between them – while 
preserving the argument‟s deductive potential. For a discussion 
of why that requirement sometimes cannot be met, see Grandy & 
Osherson 2010, Chapter 8. 
4. An interpretation assigns a truth-value to each sentence letter. 
5. Stevenson & Waite 2011, p. 1073. 
6. This is in response to Richard Robinson, who argues that 
begging the question is not a fallacy at all: “Don‟t tell me that 
my premise is true and my conclusion follows, but all the same 
my argument is bad because it „begs the question‟. That‟s 
absurd” (Robinson 1971, p. 116). 
7. Hoffman 1971, p. 51. 
8. Hoffman 1971, p. 51. 
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9. Another problem with Hoffman‟s proposal is that he does not 
offer an account of propositional identity. As David H. Sanford 
notes, “neither orthographic identity nor mutual strict implication 
does the trick” (Sanford 1972, p. 197). While the former is 
obviously not necessary, the latter does not seem to be sufficient 
insofar it condemns too many single-premise arguments. 
10. A premise-conjunct is a conjunctive component of the conjunct 
of all premises. For example, consider an argument with two 
premises, one of which, p & q, has the conjunction as its main 
connective. The other premise is r. The premise-conjuncts of this 
argument then are p, q, r, p & q, p & r, q & r, and p & q & r. 
11. John Woods and Douglas Walton consider this proposal in 
Woods & Walton 1975. 
12. Cf. Grandy & Osherson 2010, p. 103, Corollary (61). 
13. Grandy & Osherson 2010, p. 102, Definition (58). 
14. Cf. Grandy & Osherson 2010, p. 101, Definition (57). 
15. This result can also be understood set-theoretically. Consider the 
interpretation set I, whose 2
k
 elements are the k-tupels 
corresponding to the rows on the left-hand side of a truth table. 
In this picture, a sentence of PL corresponds to one and only one 
subset of I. Let p  I and q  I. p |= q, if, and only if, p  q. 
Further, p  q, if, and only if, p = q ∩ p, and q ∩ p, if, and only 
if, q & p. Therefore, p |= q, if, and only if, (q & p) |= q.  
16. Cf. Sextus Empiricus 1933, pp. 195-197, and Mill 1843, p. 120. 
17. Robinson 1971, p. 115. 
18. The claim that the prevailing conception of knowledge before 
Gettier was that of knowledge as justified true belief is disputed, 
cf. Dutant 2015, and Le Morvan 2017. 
19. Gettier 1963. 
20. That is, S would be justified in believing that p if S believed that 
p. 
21. The same is true for JS and KS, for analogous reasons. 
22.  (4) and (5) do not entail that one cannot hold contradicting 
beliefs,  if . For example, a person 
may come to believe both that , and that , without 
realizing the contradiction. That may be because the person is 
unfamiliar with formal logic, or because the two beliefs were 
formed in entirely different and unrelated contexts and the 
person has never considered both beliefs side by side. 
23. Cf. Dretske 1970, p. 1007. 
24. Cf. Dretske 1970, p. 1009. 
25. This claim has been disputed. For an introduction to the relevant 
literature, see Collins 2020, and Luper 2020. 
26. NMCKs always (“automatically”) perform obvious inferences. If 
the antecedent of a known entailment is believed for a good 
reason, the “automatic” act of inference will provide a NMCK 
with a good reason to believe that the consequent is true. Note 
that this is not to say that he or she will necessarily believe that 
the consequent is true. 
27. NMCKs have mastered one of the most basic lessons of logic, 
the modus ponens. 
28. To be clear, I did not show that there is no rhetorical, pragmatic, 
or informal fallacy that can reasonably be identified with what is 
called the fallacy of begging the question. It might very well be 
true that what is wrong with arguments that are commonly said 
to beg the question has components in two dimensions really, 
one rhetorical, pragmatic, or informal, the other epistemological. 
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